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The concept of soft law is not easily defined., One commentator defines
soft law as "all those social rules generated by States or other subjects of
international law which are not legally binding but which are nevertheless of
special legal relevance."2 Another commentator defines soft law as "a set of
written, advisory prescriptions."3 Soft law is not a contract between
sovereign states similar to a treaty.4 Under soft law, there are no "mutually
agreed obligations" among the parties.5 Soft law occasionally becomes
domestic law and its content has been used as an argument for the reform of
national laws and rules.6
In this paper, I consider the case of supervisory cooperation among
international bank regulators where voluntary cooperation (soft law) over a
period of fifty years has become hard law (regulations and directives) within
the European Union. Driven by major international bank failures or
financial crises, international standards for prudential supervisory
cooperation among bank regulators have steadily developed and become
more precise and defined since the early 1970s, resulting in the creation of a
supranational bank supervisor, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, part of
the European Central Bank.7
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, based at the Bank for
International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, has taken the lead on
developing international bank supervisory standards.8 Since the 1970s, the

Basel Committee, through its issuance of various standards for bank
supervision, has attempted to improve supervisory cooperation and reduce

systemic risk in the financial system. 9 The collapse of the Herstatt Bank in
Germany in 1974 led to the creation of the Basel Committee and the
issuance of the Committee's first agreement on bank supervision, known as
the Basel Concordat, in 1975.10 Due to its fraudulent bookkeeping practices,

the Herstatt Bank failed and other German banks were unable to bail it
out." Legal claims against the Herstatt Bank were eventually settled.12
Most of the international operations of the bank were conducted at its head
office in Germany.13 While Herstatt's assets were mainly domestic, the bank
also had significant foreign creditors.'4 The resolution of the bank's
failure-particularly

the

incomplete

satisfaction

of foreign

creditors'

claims-set a negative precedent for the settlement of international financial
crises and demonstrated the need for greater international supervisory
cooperation. '5
Organized in 1975,16 the Basel Committee's members consisted of

banking

regulators

from

eleven

major

industrialized

nations

and

8. Joseph J. Norton, The Multidimensions of the Convergence ProcessesRegarding the Prudential
Supervision of InternationalBanking Activities-The Impact of the Basel Supervisors Committee's
Efforts Upon, Within and Without the European Community, in FvsrscHuvr IN HONOR Or SIR

JOSEPH GOLD 249, 259-60 (Werner F. Ebke & Joseph J. Norton eds., 1990) [hereinafter
Norton, Multidimensions].
9. Id. at 261.
10. Richard C. Williams et al., InternationalCapital Markets: Recent Developments and ShortTerm Prospects (Int'l Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 7, Aug. 1981) 29-32, https://

www.elibrary.imf.org/doc/IMF84/03671-9781451981681/03671-9781451981681/Other-for
mats/SourcePDF/03671-9781463986964.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY2U-6WYR]. The original
Concordat was not released to the public until March 1981. See id. at 29.
11. Ulrich Hess, The Banco Ambrosiano Collapse and the Luxury of National Lenders of Last Resort
with InternationalResponsibilities, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 181, 185-86 (1990). See generally
Joseph D. Becker, InternationalInsolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A. J. 1290 (1976) (giving a
full account of the Herstatt failure). In addition, the London branch of the Franklin National
Bank suffered severe losses in the early 1970s, for which the Federal Reserve compensated with
liquidity support. Franklin National Bank eventually failed anyway, illustrating the confusion of
supervisory responsibilities over international banks. See Hess, supra note 11, at 186-87.

12. West German banks received 45 percent, foreign banks received 55 percent, and other
creditors received 65 percent of their respective claims. Hess, supra note 11, at 186.

13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. RIcHARD DALE,

THE

REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANK-NG

172 (1986);

see also

Ethan B. Kapstein, Revolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking
Regulations, 43 INT'L ORG. 323, 329 (1989); Joseph J. Norton, The Work of the Basel Supervisors
Committee on Bank Capital Adequacy and the July 1988 Report on International Convergence of
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Luxembourg.17 The purpose of the Committee was to provide "regular co-

operation between its member countries on banking supervisory matters."18
The Committee hoped to encourage the convergence of banking regulation
to a common approach through the issuance of guidelines developed by
consensus among its members; thus, it sought to harmonize the banking laws
of its member nations indirectly.19 While the Basel Committee had no legal
enforcement power itself, it encouraged member nations to abide by these
regulatory guidelines and to use whatever authority they possess to enact and
enforce them.20

II.

Basel Concordat of 1975

As a result of the Herstatt failure and the subsequent confusion it caused
over the settlement of the bank's liabilities, the Basel Committee set as its
first task the establishment of an agreement on the respective roles of home
country supervisors to ensure that all international financial institutions are
supervised.21 The Committee fulfilled this task by issuing the Basel
Concordat,22 a statement of principles delineating the supervisory
responsibilities of home and host banking regulators over international
banks.23 The Committee entitled the document a "concordat" to indicate
that the agreement did not have the legal force of a treaty. 24 Rather, the
Concordat was a set of guidelines on bank supervision reached by consensus
among banking regulators from many nations.25
CapitalMeasurement and CapitalStandards, 23
InternationalConvergence].

INr'L

L. 245, 246-47 (1989) [hereinafter Norton,

17. Norton, International Convergence supra note 16, at 248 n.18; see also Norton,
Multidimensions, supra note 8, at 8. See generally Marilyn B. Cane & David A. Barclay,
Competitive Inequality: American Banking in the InternationalArena, 13 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L.
Rrv. 273, 319 n.321 (1990) (providing background on the Bank for International Settlements
and the Basel Committee); James V. Hackney & Kim Leslie Shafer, The Regulation of
InternationalBanking: An Assessment of InternationalInstitutions, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. & Com.
REG. 474, 488-89 (1986) (same).
18. Peter Cooke, The Basel "Concordat" on Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, 39

AussENW1RTScHAFT 151, 151 (1984).
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See Richard Dale, Someone Must Be in Charge, FrN. TimEs, July 22, 1991, at 12.
22. Williams et al., supra note 10.
23. The home or parent regulator is the one responsible for supervision in the country where
the "parent bank" is headquartered and licensed. The host regulator is the one responsible for
supervision in the foreign country where the "parent bank" is operating an establishment. See

id. at 30.
24. M.S. Mendelsohn, New Basel Concordat: Main Deficiency is Intact, Am.
1983, at 2.

BANKER,

June 16,

25. See id. The word "concordat" refers to a "public act of agreement" (as opposed to a
"contract" between private parties). Id. However, the text of the Concordat was not released to
the public for several years following its adoption. Cooke, The Basel "Concordat"on Supervision
of Banks' Foreign Establishments, supra note 18, at 152.
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The objectives of the Concordat were to ensure that the supervision of
foreign banks was adequate and that no foreign bank would escape

supervision.26

A central tenet of the Concordat was the joint

responsibility of home and host banking regulators in regulating

international banks.27 The Concordat set forth five principles:
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be the

joint responsibility of host and parent authorities.
(2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, each
country should ensure that foreign banking establishments are

supervised, and supervision should be adequate as judged by both host
and parent authorities.
(3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility

of host authorities since foreign establishments generally have to
conform to local practices for their liquidity management and must
comply with local regulations.
(4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be
essentially a matter for the parent authority. In the case of subsidiaries,
while primary responsibility lies with the host authority, parent

authorities should take account of the exposure of their domestic banks'
moral commitment in this regard.

(5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated

by transfers of

information between host and parent authorities and by the granting of

permission for inspections by or on behalf of parent authorities on the
territory of the host authority. Every effort should be made to remove

any legal restraints (particularly in the field of professional secrecy or
national sovereignty) which might hinder these forms of cooperation.28
The Concordat had several weaknesses. First, despite the agreement's goal

of allocating supervisory responsibility, it left unclear which regulator should
act in order to contain a major bank failure.29 Also, designating the host
supervisor as the primary regulator of the solvency of a foreign bank
subsidiary ran counter to the principle of consolidated supervision used by

bank regulators in most industrialized nations.30 With these conflicting
allocations of responsibility in the Concordat, there was a real danger that
26. Williams et al., supra note 10, at 29.

27. Dale, Someone Must Be in Charge, supra note 21, at 12; see also DALE, THE

REGULATION

OF

INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 16, at 172.

28. W. Peter Cooke, Supervising MultinationalBanking Organizations:Evolving Techniquesfor
CooperationAmong Supervisory Authorities, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 244, 246 (1981)

(summarizing the Basel Concordat); see also Richard Dale, Basel Concordat: Lessons from
Ambrosiano, BANKER, Sept. 1983, at 55 (same).
29. See Kapstein, supra note 16, at 330.
30. DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 16, at 173. Under
consolidated supervision, responsibility for regulating a bank's foreign subsidiaries is shared

between host and parent regulators, with the parent supervisor considering all of the assets and

liabilities of the bank, wherever located, in order to determine the bank's overall solvency. See
id. at 176. See generally Council Directive 83/350 of 13 June 1983 on the Supervision of Credit
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host regulators, following consolidated supervision, would look to parent

supervisors to regulate a bank subsidiary's solvency while parent regulators,
relying upon the Concordat, would look to the host supervisor to perform
this task.1
Another weakness of the Concordat was its lack of specific supervisory
standards for international bank regulators to employ.32 This lack of specific
standards created confusion among banking regulators and allowed
individual nations to interpret the Concordat as they wished.33 Other
misconceptions resulted from the Concordat. The most important and
potentially dangerous was the mistaken belief that lender of last resort
responsibility accompanied supervisory responsibility.34 The Committee
never intended the Concordat to deal with lender of last resort
responsibility.35
The financial collapse during the summer of 1982 of the Luxembourg
subsidiary of the Banco Ambrosiano, an Italian bank, tested the principles of
the Concordat. The Banco Ambrosiano subsidiary in Luxembourg had
made $1.4 billion worth of imprudent loans to Latin American companies.36
As a result, the subsidiary owed nearly $450 million to its creditors.7
Unable to pay its creditors, the bank and its Luxembourg subsidiary

collapsed in July 1982.38
Neither the Luxembourg nor the Italian regulators claimed supervisory or

lender of last resort responsibility for the bank.39 The Italian regulators
argued that because they lacked the legal authority to regulate the
Luxembourg subsidiary, they bore little or no responsibility for its failure.1
In contrast, Luxembourg regulators believed that a subsidiary operating
under the same name as its parent bank (as was the case with the
Luxembourg subsidiary of Banco Ambrosiano) should have been supported
Institutions on a Consolidated Basis,

1983 O.J. (L 193) 18 (representing the European

Community's adoption of consolidated supervision principles).
31. DALE, THE REGULATION

OF

INTERNATIONAL

BANKING,

supra

note 16, at 173.

The

"primary motivation" for drafting the Revised Concordat, adopted in 1983, was to "incorporate
understandings on applying the principle of consolidated supervision." Cooke, The Basel
"Concordat"on Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, supra note 18, at 152-53.

THE
33. Id. at 174.
32. DALE,

REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING,

supra note

16,

at 173.

34. Lender of last resort responsibility refers to the obligation of a central bank or regulator to
provide as much liquidity as necessary to a bank in order to meet its obligations to depositors
and creditors. Id.
35. Id.; Cooke, The Basel "Concordat"on Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, supra note
18, at 153-54. The Basel Concordat is silent on this point.
36. Hess, supra note 11, at 189.

37. Id. at 190.
38. Id. at 189-90.
39. DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 16, at 175. See
generally MAXIMILIAN J.B. HALL, FINANCIAL DEREGULATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 202 n.32 (1987) (describing the Banco Ambrosiano

collapse and its resolution).

40.

DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING,

supra note

16, at 175.
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either by the parent bank or indirectly by the central bank of the parent
bank.41 Given that the parent bank of Banco Ambrosiano was headquartered
in Italy, Luxembourg regulators believed that the parent bank or the Italian
central bank should have supported the Luxembourg subsidiary bank.42

II.

Revised Concordat of 1983

The Basel Committee responded to the collapse of the Luxembourg
subsidiary of Banco Ambrosiano by issuing in May 1983 a reformulation of
the Concordat, known as the Revised Concordat.43 Even though W. Peter
Cooke, chairperson of the Basel Committee, believed that the failure of
Banco Ambrosiano was a unique event, 44 the Basel Committee made
substantive changes to their international agreement.
The Revised Concordat was not an entirely new agreement, but built

upon the 1975 Concordat.45 Like its predecessor, it was a non-binding
agreement that embodied "recommended guidelines of best practices."46
Under the Revised Concordat, nations still retained authority to license
banks with few restrictions-even banks they were unable to regulate
effectively.47 Furthermore, there was no incentive for compliance with the
Revised Concordant, except for the political pressure or moral authority that
bank regulators could exercise on their recalcitrant colleagues.48 But with

the Revised Concordat, the Basel Committee did attempt to close the
supervisory gaps that existed under the Concordat and to address directly
the adequacy of supervision of foreign financial institutions.49
As with the 1975 Concordat, a primary objective of the Revised

Concordat was to ensure that no foreign banking establishment would
escape

supervision and that each

establishment would be

supervised

41. See id. at 175, 57. The turmoil resulting from Banco Ambrosiano's failure ended when two

settlement agreements were signed: the first between the liquidators of Banco Ambrosiano and
the creditors of the Luxembourg holding company (and its foreign subsidiaries); and the second
between the creditors of Banco Ambrosiano and the creditors of the Vatican bank. Hess, supra
note 11, at 194-95. In the aftermath of the Banco Ambrosiano affair, the Italian Parliament

passed a law that required disclosure of the shareholder structure of banks and also passed
enabling legislation for the 1983 Council Directive on Supervision. Id. at 199.

42. Hess, supra note 11, at 191.
43. Revised

Basel

Concordat

on Principles

for the

Supervision

of Banks'

Foreign

Establishment, July 1983, 22 I.L.M. 900, 901 [hereinafter Revised Concordat]; see also Dale,
Someone Must Be in Charge, supra note 21, at 12.

44. HALL, supra note 39, at 166.
45. See id.; Cooke, The Basel "Concordat" on Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, supra
note 18, at 152; see also Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 901.
46. Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 901.
47. See Mendelsohn, supra note 24, at 2 (criticizing the Basel Committee for repeating its

failure to address the lender of last resort responsibility in the Revised Concordat).
48. See id. (noting that the Revised Concordat remained "no more than an informal
agreement").

49. See id. at 1.
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adequately.5o The Revised Concordat introduced a "dual key" approach
whereby both home and host supervisory authorities assessed the quality of
each other's supervision of an international bank.51 A bank regulator in a
host jurisdiction had to be satisfied that the parent bank was being
supervised adequately in the parent jurisdiction, and the parent jurisdiction
had to be satisfied that all foreign operations were being supervised
adequately by local regulators.52 If the host regulator considered the
supervision of the parent bank by the parent regulator insufficient, the host
regulator had the right to discourage or prohibit the foreign bank from
operating within the host jurisdiction, or it could set conditions for the
bank's continued operation there.53 Likewise, the parent regulator could
attempt to extend the jurisdictional reach of its supervision if it did not
believe that the host regulator was providing adequate supervision of the

operations of the foreign bank; alternatively, it could discourage the parent
bank from operating in the host nation.54 Using this "dual key" approach,

the Committee intended to prevent a "race to the bottom"-the tendency
for jurisdictions to relax financial regulation and supervision in order to
attract more foreign investment.55
In the case of the failure of the Luxembourg subsidiary of Banco
Ambrosiano, no regulator took responsibility for the supervision of the
Luxembourg-based bank.56 Applying the terms of the Revised Concordat to
the situation that existed there, Luxembourg would have had the primary
responsibility to supervise the subsidiary, but if the parent regulator (Italy)
had not been satisfied with that supervision, it could have tried to step in and
regulate the bank.57
The Revised Concordat adopted the principle of consolidated supervision,
by which the parent regulator monitors the parent bank's risk exposure and

capital adequacy based on all the operations of the bank, wherever
conducted.ss Drafters of the Revised Concordat acknowledged that
50. Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 903.
51. Dale, Someone Must Be in Charge, supra note 21, at 12.
52. Id.; see Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 903-04. The "dual key" approach is highly

dependent on effective communication and active cooperation among host and parent
regulators. See id. at 901-02.
53. Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 903-04; DALE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BANING, supra note 16, at 175. This provision was a concession to U.S.
regulatory authorities, whose previous attempts to monitor the status of foreign parent banks
with U.S. offices were met with strong resistance from foreign supervisory authorities. Id. at 57.
54. Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 903.
55. Dale, Someone Must Be in Charge, supra note 21, at 12.

56.

DALE,

TILE

REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL

BANKING, supra note 16, at 176.

57. See Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 903. The Revised Concordat calls for a
concerned parent regulator to extend its supervision in such a manner "to the degree that it is
practicable." Id.

58. Id. at 905.
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adoption of this concept could extend the traditional limits of a parent
regulator's supervisory responsibility.59
The difficulty of implementing consolidated supervision seemed evident
from the drafters' treatment of the supervision of international bank holding

companies.O The Revised Concordat designated the host regulator (rather
than the parent regulator) as the primary supervisor of subsidiary banks
belonging to a bank holding company but failed to designate a primary
regulator of the bank holding company. 61 This would prove to be a very
significant gap and was a factor in the subsequent failure of BCCI in 1991.62

As banks expand into new and different lines of business, they tend to
develop complex holding company structures. Banco Ambrosiano's
attenuated and far-flung corporate structure allowed it to escape effective

regulation.63 Under the terms set forth in the Revised Concordat, a holding
company with independent banks operating in different countries could

avoid meaningful regulation because no one regulator had responsibility for
the parent's overall health.64 Likewise, effective supervision of a holding

company with both bank and non-bank subsidiaries also required the
cooperation of different regulators.65
Overall, the Revised Concordat differed significantly from the 1975
Concordat.66 Unlike the 1975 version, it adopted consolidated supervision,
an important technique for monitoring the overall risk exposure and capital

adequacy of a bank; introduced the "dual key" approach; and explicitly stated
that it was not meant to address lender of last resort responsibility.67
The Revised Concordat, like its predecessor, also contained some
weaknesses. One major problem was the explicit refusal to address the issue
of lender of last resort responsibility.68 Theoretically, if banking regulators
cooperate to prevent bank failures, they should also cooperate in upholding
the international banking system when a failure is imminent. The Revised

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 904.
62. See Dale, Someone Must Be in Charge, supra note 21, at 12 (pointing out that BCCI's

structure was such that it could avoid stringent consolidated supervision under the Revised
Concordat).
63. Banco Ambrosiano consisted of a parent bank in Italy and several foreign subsidiaries,
including banks located in Peru, Panama, and Luxembourg. See Hess, supra note 11, at 189-90.
The Luxembourg subsidiary, Banco Ambrosiano Holding, itself had a Bahamian subsidiary,
Banco Ambrosiano Overseas Ltd. See id. at 190.
64. See Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 904.

65.
66.
67.
68.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 901.
Id. (stating that Revised Concordat does not address lender of last resort responsibility);

Mendelsohn, supra note 24, at 2.
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Concordat, however, lacked any statement on what should happen if this
supervisory system failed.69
The Revised Concordat purposely blurred host and parent regulatory
responsibilities in order to avoid the pointing of fingers that occurred among
regulators after the 1982 failure of Banco Ambrosiano.70 In doing so,
however, it also appeared to create problems of overlapping authority and
responsibility in cases where one regulator was designated the primary
regulator, but another regulator also had a strong interest in maintaining
effective supervision over a foreign bank.71 This blurring of responsibility
created uncertainty for regulators over their supervisory responsibilities.72
In theory, the parent regulator ultimately should have responsibility for the
safety and soundness of its banks-in all of their forms and establishments,
foreign and domestic.73 The principle of consolidated supervision allows a
parent regulator, in the course of enforcing its own regulations, to approve
or disapprove of its banks' foreign operation.74 This power would prevent
crises in the foreign establishments of its domestic banks while assuring the
health of the domestic banks as well.75 Despite significant improvements
over the original Concordat, the Revised Concordat left gaps in the
coordination of international bank regulations.

IV.

Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International

Banking Groups
The principles underlying the Revised Concordat were tested in the
failure of BCCI in the early 1990s. In a coordinated action on July 5, 1991,
regulators in eight nations closed all the BCCI branches located within their
jurisdictions.76 At the time BCCI had total assets of approximately $20
billion and was operating in sixty-nine countries, with the largest
concentration of its deposits in the United Kingdom.77 Due to the absence
69. David W. Wise, International PrudentialRegulation of Commercial Banks,

BANK ADM[N.,

June 1985, at 58, 62. "Just as laws should provide for their own enforcement, supervision
should provide for the eventuality that such supervision can fail." Id.

70. Id.
71. See e.g., Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 906 (stating that the countries in which joint
ventures are incorporated-host countries-have primary responsibility for supervising the
joint venture, but that the parent regulators of banks that are shareholders in the joint venture
cannot ignore supervision of the joint venture).
72. Wise, supra note 69, at 62.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Max Hall, The BCCI Affair, BANKING WoRLo, Sept. 1991, at 8. The eight nations were

the Cayman Islands, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Id. Indeed, on that day, action to shut down BCCI's activities was taken
in more than sixty nations. Id.
77. Statement by J. Virgil Mattingly, Jr., Gen. Counsel, and William Taylor, Staff Director,
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and E. Gerald Corrigan, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Before the

92
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of any international law governing the closure of an international bank, local
regulators acted under separate national laws.78 By July 6, 1991, BCCI

offices in eighteen countries either were closed or had their operations
restricted.79 The closure of BCCI branches continued for several weeks, and

by July 29, 1991, forty-four jurisdictions had closed BCCI offices located
within their borders.80
The immediate reason for the closure of BCCI was the Bank of England's

receipt of a June 1991 report prepared by Price Waterhouse that detailed
massive fraud committed by BCCI's senior managers. 81 Through the mid1980s, the treasury operations of BCCI suffered huge losses. Senior
managers siphoned off deposits to cover these losses.82 If the depositors

withdrew their money, then other deposits were diverted to cover the losses.
This practice resulted in an endless series of fraudulent transactions.83
In response to the failure of BCCI, the Basel Committee issued the
Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups.84

The Basel Committee reformulated the principles reflected in the
Concordat and the Revised Concordat into Minimum Standards for bank
supervision.85 The main features of the new Minimum Standards are that:
(1) all international banks and banking groups should be supervised by a
"home-country" regulator; (2) an international bank should obtain the

permission of both the host and home regulators before opening a
branch or other banking establishment in a foreign nation; (3) banking
regulators should have the right to gather information from
international banks; (4) if the minimum standards are not met, a host
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 77 FED.

RES. BULL. 902, 905 (Sept 13, 1991) [hereinafter Mattingly Statement]. BCCI was no longer
accepting retail deposits in its U.S. offices because of actions taken previously by U.S. bank
regulators. Id. at 907.
78. Cf Claire Makin, Learning From BCCI, INSTITUTIONAL INv., Nov. 1991, at 93-95
(discussing various local investigations into BCCI and the lack of overall international
accountability). In a 1989 interview, former BCCI chief executive, Swaleh Naqvi,
acknowledged that "[b]ecause we do not have a dominant presence in any single country, the
full impact of what we are doing is not visible." Id. at 94.
79. Mattingly Statement, supra note 77, at 903.

80. Id.
81. Hall, supra note 76, at 8. The Bank of England had commissioned the report under
Section 41 of the 1987 Banking Act, which permits the investigation of banks on behalf of

depositors. Banking Act (1987), § 41, 4 HALs. STAT. (4th ed.) 527, 574-76 (U.K.).
82. David Lascelles, A Never-ending Spiral of Fraud, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at 32. There
are estimates that BCCI raised over $600 million in unrecorded deposits. See All Things to All
Men, ECONOMIST, July 27, 1991, at 67, 68.
83. Lascelles, supra note 82, at 32.
84. See Minimum Standardsfor the Supervision of InternationalBanking Groups and Their CrossBorder Establishments, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION (1992), https://www.bis.org/

publ/bcbsc314.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K2P-TXH7] [hereinafter Minimum Standards].
85. See id. The 1990 Supplement to the Revised Concordat concerning "Information flows
between banking supervisory authorities" was not made part of the Minimum Standards. Id. at

2.
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regulator may impose restrictive measures against the international
bank; and (5) information exchanges between regulators in different
nations should continue to be encouraged.86
The Minimum Standards specifically state that all international banks should
be subject to consolidated supervision by their home regulators.87
Consolidated supervision requires that the home-country regulator receive
information that can be confirmed as reliable on the global operations of the

particular international bank.88 This information is then assessed as to the
light it sheds on the safety and soundness of the international bank.89 Under
the Minimum Standards, home-country bank regulators can prevent the
creation of corporate affiliations that undermine the application of
consolidated supervision or that hinder effective regulation,90 and they can
prevent the opening of banking establishments in a foreign jurisdiction if,
for example, they are not satisfied with that host country's supervision of
foreign banks.91
The host country regulator likewise has the responsibility to ensure that
the home-country regulator has the ability to meet these minimum
standards.92 According to the Minimum Standards, an international bank
must receive permission from both its home country and host country
regulators before opening a cross-border banking establishment.93 In
determining whether to approve a foreign operation, the host country

regulator can consider the bank's strength of its capital, organization, and
94
The approval of any new
operating procedures for risk management.
banking establishment should be contingent upon a multilateral agreement
among regulators that each may gather the information necessary for
effective home country supervision.95 That is, regulators should reach a
mutual understanding that they can gather information from establishments
within each other's jurisdiction.96
The Minimum Standards make the same allocation of supervisory
responsibilities between home country and host country regulators as was set
forth in the Revised Concordat, except in cases where the regulators have
decided that that allocation is inappropriate.97 If a regulator determines that

86. The Minimum Standards use the terms "home-country" and "host-country" in lieu of

"parent" and "host." InternationalPanel on Banking Revises Minimum Standards, WALL ST.
July 7, 1992, at C25.

J.,

87. Minimum Standards, supra note 84, at 3.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
See id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.

94. Id. The home-country regulator, of course, should consider the same factors.

95. Id. at 4-5.
96. Id. at 5-6.
97. See id. The allocations referred to are found in the Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at
905-08; see also supra text accompanying notes 92-101.
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this allocation is not appropriate in the regulation of a particular bank, then
it must reach an explicit agreement with its counterpart on a more
appropriate allocation of supervisory responsibility.98 In other words, under

the Minimum Standards, there can be no evasion of responsibility.99 In the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, the Revised Concordat allocates
supervisory responsibilities.10
In its statement accompanying the issuance of the Minimum Standards,

the Basel Committee stated, "[t]he minimum standards are designed to
provide greater assurances that in the future no international bank can
operate without being subject to effective, consolidated supervision.",1l The

Minimum Standards themselves make clear that consolidated supervision is a
vital regulatory principle and that no further debate on its importance is

required. 102
Under the new standards, the home country regulator is clearly the
primary supervisor of the foreign banking establishments of a bank
incorporated in the home country.103 According to the new standards, a
single bank regulator must exercise primary regulatory authority over an
international bank.o4 This prevents any sort of weak collegial regulatory

arrangement, similar to the one that attempted to supervise BCCI for several
years. 105
The most important change provided in the new standards is the
formalization of the principle that an international bank must receive the
permission of both home and host regulators before it can open a foreign
banking establishment.106 This double approval for the establishment of a
new foreign branch will prevent the finger-pointing that had occurred in the
past after a bank failure.107 In approving the foreign banking establishment,

the host regulator should be satisfied that the home regulator will supervise
the foreign bank on a consolidated basis.108 If not satisfied, the host
regulator can prevent the foreign bank from opening the branch.109
98. Minimum Standards, supra note 84, at 5.

99. See also Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 903.
100. Id. at 901.
101. Duncan E. Alford, Basel Committee Minimum Standards:International Regulatory Response to

the Failureof BCCI, 26 GW J. INT'L & ECON. 241, 269 (1992).
102. Id.
103. Erik Ipsen, Central Bankers Unveil New Anti-Fraud Rules, INT'L

HERALD

TRIB., July 7,

1992, at 9; see Minimum Standards, supra note 84, at 3.

104. Learningfrom BCCI, FiN. TuEs, July 7, 1992, at 18. Specifically, the Minimum Standards
state that "[a]ll ... international banks should be supervised by a home-country authority that
capably performs consolidated supervision." Minimum Standards, supra note 84, at 3.
105. Mattingly Statement, supra note 77, at 917-18. See Section VI for discussion of
supervisory colleges.
106. See Minimum Standards, supra note 84, at 4; see also Ipsen, supra note 103, at 9.
107. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards to Prevent Fraud, at A-1.
108. See Minimum Standards, supra note 84, at 4; Learningfrom BCCI, supra note 104, at 18.
109. See Minimum Standards, supra note 84, at 6 (stating that the host-country regulator should

prevent creation of a foreign bank establishment when it is dissatisfied with the home-country's
supervision).
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Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision

Responding to the continued growth of international banking and the
need for improved bank supervision, the Basel Committee eventually
developed broader, more substantive standards for bank supervision.110
Rather than focusing merely on the coordination of international bank
supervision,'l the Basel Committee provided comprehensive minimum
standards for bank supervision when it published the Core Principles in
1997.112
In the 1990s, several prominent bank failures occurred."3 In February
1995, the venerable Barings Bank of London (Barings) failed after a trader in
the Singapore operation, Nicholas Leeson, had lost over £927 million (U.S.$
1.1 billion) in the futures market in Singapore.14 Leeson took advantage of
his position as both a trader and manager of the settlements operation in
Barings' Singapore office to hide his losses from his managers for several
years." 5 By the time these losses were discovered, they exceeded Barings'
capital.116 Despite intense negotiations, the Bank of England refused to
support Barings, and the bank was put into receivership in February 1995
and subsequently sold to International Netherlands Group (ING).'1
Later in 1995, the Federal Reserve Board revoked the charter of the New
York branch of the Daiwa Bank (Daiwa) because of its concealment of over
$1 billion in unrecorded trading losses incurred in the bond market."1
Daiwa had informed the Japanese Ministry of Finance of this information on
August 8, 1995."9 The Ministry of Finance, however, delayed
communicating the information to the Federal Reserve Board until
September 18, 1995.120 The Federal Reserve promptly issued an order
under the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act closing the Daiwa
branch, which wound up its U.S. operations on February 2, 1996.121 The
Daiwa closing preceded a 1997 financial crisis that spread across Asia and
110. See Core Principlesfor Effective Banking Supervision, 37 I.L.M. 405, 410 (1998) (presenting
guiding principles for bank supervision).

111. Id. at 406.
112. Id. at 405.
113. George Hanc, The Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s: Summary and Implications,
BANKING REV. 1, 1 fig.1.1 (1998).

11 F.D.I.C.

114. Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, Globalization of FinancialRisks and International
Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons from the BaringsDebacle, 30 INT'L L. 301, 309

(1996).
115. See id. at 307-09.
116. See id. at 4-5, 18 n.121.
117. See id. at 323.
118. Kristin Leigh Case, The Daiwa Wake-Up Call: The Need for Standards for Banking

Supervision, 26 GA. J.
119. Id. at 216.
120. Id. at 217.
121. Id. at 215.

INT'L

& COMP. L. 215, 215-16 (1996).
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resulted in the closure of many banks and the dramatic decrease in the gross
national products of nations such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.122

During this volatile period, the finance ministers and bank regulators of
the G-7 were becoming uneasy about the stability of the international
financial system. 23 At the 1996 G-7 summit in Lyon, France, the leaders

(through the Summit Communique) requested standard-setting bodies,
including the Basel Committee, to draft more comprehensive and detailed
financial standards.124 The leaders stated in the communique that:
We welcome the work accomplished by the international bodies
concerned with banking and securities regulation. Over the year ahead,
we should seek to make maximum progress on .

.

. encouraging the

adoption of strong prudential standards in emerging economies and
increasing cooperation with their supervisory authorities; international

financial institutions and bodies should increase their efforts to promote
effective supervisory structures in these economies.125
The Basel Committee responded to this call by issuing the Core Principles
6
in September 1997, slightly over one year after the G-7's request. 12
The Core Principles set forth broad guidelines on best practices for bank
supervision.127 The document did not merely deal with the coordination of
supervision of internationally active banks. Instead, its initial twenty-four
guidelines provide standards for supervising entire national banking systems

from the licensing of banks to their closure due to insolvency.128 Three of
the initial twenty-four principles dealt with cross-border banking, which
previously had been the focus of the Basel Committee's standard-setting
work.129 The remainder set forth guidelines for the supervision of banks,

even those without international operations.130 This document represented
a major expansion of the Basel Committee's work on bank supervision.
122. See generally Peter G. Peterson et al., Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global FinancialSystem:

The Future of the InternationalFinancial Architecture, CoUNcIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 17,
1999), https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/reportpdf/SafeguardingProsperity.pdf?_
ga=2.122280715.1037029839.1572708904-1815848409.1572708904 [https://perma.cc/SL5KLC2M] (discussing a task force implemented to combat the Asian financial crisis); Peter Kenen,
The New InternationalFinancial Architecture: Reconstruction, Renovation or Minor Repair?, 5 INT'L
J. FIN. & ECON. 1, 7-9 (2000) (exploring Thailand's bank failures).
123. Lyon Summit Communique: Making a Success of Globalizationfor the Benefit of All art. 1, 115,
June 28, 1996, 7 U.S. DEP'T STATE DIsrATcH [hereinafter Lyon Communique].
124. See id. at art. 1, T 10-11.
125. Id. at art. 1, ¶ 11.
126. See Denver Summit of the Eight, Final Report to the G-7 Heads of State and Government on
Promoting Financial Stability 1 (1997), http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1997denver/

fianrpt.htm [https://perma.cc/UE5E-B5C3].
127. Core Principlesfor Effective Banking Supervision, supra note 110, at 405 (presenting guiding
principles for bank supervision).

128. See id. at 4-7.
129. Id. at 41-43.
130. See id. at 4-7.

OPERATION OF SUPERVISORY COLLEGES

2021]

97

The current twenty-nine principles are divided into two subject
categories: powers, responsibilities, and functions of supervisors (Principles
1 to 13) and prudential regulations and requirements (Principles 14 to 29).31
Three principles relate to supervisory cooperation: Principles 3, 12, and
13.132

Principle
regulations,

3 (Cooperation and consolidation) states that laws,
or other arrangements provide a framework for

cooperation and collaboration with relevant domestic authorities and
foreign supervisors.33 These arrangements reflect the need to protect
confidential information.
Principle 12 (Consolidated Supervision) states that an essential
element of banking supervision is that the supervisor supervises the
banking group on a consolidated basis, adequately monitoring and, as
appropriate, applying prudential standards to all aspects of the business
conducted by the banking group worldwide.134
Principle 13 (Home-host Relationships) states that home and host
supervisors of cross-border banking groups share information and
cooperate for effective supervision of the group and group entities, and
effective handling of crisis situations.35 Supervisors require the local
operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same standards as
those required of domestic banks.136
In effect, the Basel Committee incorporated the Minimum Standards into
the Core Principles.

VI. The Great Recession and Greater Use of Supervisory
Colleges
Supervisory colleges are "permanent but flexible coordination structures
that bring together the competent authorities involved in supervising crossborder banking groups."137 Their purpose is
to more effectively supervise G-SIBs [global systemically important
banks] and other internationally active banking groups by strengthening
information-sharing among supervisors, helping the development of a
common understanding of risk in banking groups, promoting a shared
agenda for addressing risks and vulnerabilities, and providing a platform
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 9, 13, 32, 41.
See id. at 9, 13.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 10-11.
Annual Report on Supervisory Activities,

EUR.

CENTRAL

BANK 64 (2017), https://

www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/annual-report/pdf/ssm.ar

[https://perma.cc/9BK6-YEF4].

017.en.pdf
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college

members.138
Supervisory colleges play a valuable role in the supervision of internationally

active banks, particularly the largest global banks.
The Great Recession of 2007-2008 provided the impetus for deepened

supervisory cooperation. To address the financial crisis, the leaders of the
G20 nations met in Washington, D.C., in November 2008.139 The G20 in

its communique at the end of this summit on financial markets and the world
economy noted the importance of the use of colleges of supervisors to
enhance supervisory cooperation related to global banks.1' This joint
communiqu6 stated that by March 31, 2009, "supervisors should collaborate
to establish supervisory colleges for all major cross-border financial
institutions, as part of the efforts to strengthen the surveillance of crossborder firms. Major global banks should meet regularly with their

supervisory college for comprehensive discussions of the firm's activities and
assessments of the risks it faces."141 The countries at the Washington
Summit in 2008 agreed to meet again in London by April 30, 2009 to review
the implementation of these principles and decisions.142
During the London Summit on April 2, 2009, G20 leaders themselves
agreed "to establish the much greater consistency and systemic cooperation

between countries, and the framework of internationally agreed high
standards, that a global financial system requires."143 The G20 leaders
affirmed their finance ministers' recommendation and established the
Financial Stability Board, as successor to the Financial Stability Forum,'"
138. ProgressReport on the Implementation of the Principlesfor Effective Supervisory Colleges, BASEL
CoMM. ON BANKrNG SUPERVISION 1

(July

2015), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/pubb/d329.pdf

[https://perma.cc/6E2C-F34H). A G-SIB is a global systemically important bank as defined by
the Financial Stability Board. Id. at 2.
139. G20 Leaders, Declaration Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy 1 (2008),
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/g20_leadersdeclaration_washington_2008.pdf

&

[https://perma.cc/XYL6-NCG8].
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id. at 1.
142. Id.
143. The Global Planfor Recovery and Reform: The Communiquefrom the London Summit, 15 L.
Bus. REv. AM. 703, 705 (2009).

144. Previously in 2008, in two separate reports, the Financial Stability Forum had
recommended the expanded use of colleges of supervisors. In its April 2008 report, the

Financial Stability Forum recommended that all global banks be supervised by a college of
supervisors and that supervisors should build on existing examples of supervisory colleges both

in the Basel II framework and in regional arrangements, such as within the European Union.
The purpose of the colleges is to enhance cooperation on supervisory issues and each college
would be organized differently depending on the structure of the global bank it was supervising.
Similarly, the forum recommended that by 2009 the colleges should conduct an exercise to

draw lessons about best practices of colleges of supervisors. Financial Stability Forum, Report of
the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience 42 (Apr. 7, 2008),
[https://perma.cc/PU8Phttp://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0804.pdf

V4VJ]. In October 2008, the FSF updated its April 2008 report on how supervisors had
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with the goal of extending "regulation and oversight to all systemically
important financial institutions, instruments and markets"145 and emphasized
the use and development of colleges of supervisors in supervising global
banks. Furthermore, the Financial Stability Board would expand its
membership to include all G20 countries, FSF members,146 Spain, and the
European Commission,14? further recognizing the global nature of the
financial system.
The G20 leaders generally charged the Financial Stability Board with
assessing "vulnerabilities in the financial system," and then identifying and
overseeing actions to address them.14 Related to colleges of supervisors, the
FSB was tasked to "promote coordination and information exchange among
authorities responsible for financial stability" and to "set guidelines for, and
support the establishment, functioning of, and participation in supervisory
colleges, including through the ongoing identification of the most
systemically important cross-border firms."149 In fact, twenty-eight colleges
for systemically important institutions were in place by April 2009.150
implemented its extensive recommendations. The FSF noted that authorities had expanded
their use of colleges of supervisors to enhance communication among supervisors, "building on
existing examples of colleges, such as in the Basel II framework and in the EU." Id. Because of
the FSF's earlier work on international financial supervision, the G20 expanded the FSF's role
and created the Financial Stability Board with added responsibilities. Financial Stability Forum,

Report of the FinancialStability Forum on Enhancing Market and InstitutionalResilience 24 (Oct. 10,
2008), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_081009f.pdf [https:/perma.cc/R75HJEJU]. The Financial Stability Forum is an organization of financial regulators housed at the
Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. It periodically meets and issues
reports on issues related to financial services regulation on a global basis.
145. The Global Planfor Recovery and Reform, supra note 143, at T 15.
146. Finance ministries and central banks from the following nations are members of the
Financial Stability Board: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. The following international organizations are also members: the Bank for
International Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, The
International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
and the World Bank, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the
International Accounting Standards Board, and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions. See Member Institutions, FrN. STAnn1jTY Bo., http://www.financialstabilityboard.
org/members/links.htm [https://perma.cc/QDQ7-AFB3] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020).
147. The Global Planfor Recovery and Reform, supra note 143, at 705.

148. G20, Declarationon Strengthening the FinancialSystem: London Summit, FIN. STABILITY BD.,
1 (Apr. 2, 2009), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/londonsummitdeclaration_
onstr_financial_system.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKA6-Z499].
149. Id. at 1.
150. ProgressReport on the Actions of the Washington Action Plan, SERVICIO OE DIFUs1ON

CREAC1ON

INTELECTUAL: UNrvERSIDAD NACIONAL

DE

DE LA

LA PLATA 1-21, at 15 (Apr. 2, 2009),

http://sedici.unp.edu.ar/bitstream/handle/10915/48031/G20_-ProgressReport-onthe_Ac
tionsof_the_WashingtonActionPlan_21_p._.pdf?sequence=10&isAllowed=&

perma.cc/6B7F-S33E].
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Meeting again in September 2009 in Pittsburgh, the G20 leaders assessed

progress on their previously agreed goals and noted an improvement in the
world economy since they met in London.15s They expressed their resolve
to ensure the "regulatory system for banks and other financial firms reins in

the excesses that led to the crisis" and "[w]here reckless behavior and a lack
of responsibility led to crisis, we [the G20] will not allow a return to banking
as usual."152 The G20 declared themselves to be "the premier forum for our
international economic cooperation,"[s5 replacing the G-7 in that role. The

G20 noted the substantial progress achieved in establishing supervisory
colleges and reinforcing international cooperation among supervisors.154

Furthermore, the G20 recognized that solving cross-border insolvency of
systemically

important

financial

institutions

must

occur155

so

that

governments will be less likely to bail out institutions in order to prevent a
collapse of the financial system.
In November 2009, the G20 finance ministers met in St. Andrews to
review progress thus far.156 They called for the Basel Committee for

Banking Supervision to issue stronger prudential standards for banks by the
end of 2010.157 They reported that more than thirty colleges have been
established for complex financial institutions158 and requested the Basel
Committee, the FSB, and the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors to review the operations of colleges in 2009.159
The Basel Committee on Banking SupervisionloO followed through on the

G20 call to review operations of supervisory colleges and urged better
supervisory coordination through supervisory colleges globally. In its
October 2010 pronouncement, Good Practice Principleson Supervisory Colleges
(the Principles), the Basel Committee issued eight general principles on the
151. Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, 1 (Sept. 24-25, 2009), https://g20.org/en/g20/
Documents/2009-PittsburghDeclaration.pdf [https:/perma.cc/6LA2-8QTT].

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2.
at 3.
at 7.
at 9.

156. See G20, Communique: Meeting of Finance Ministers & Central Bank Governors, United
Kingdom, U.S. DEP'T TREAsuRY (Nov. 7, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-

releases/Documents/
g20%20st%20andrews%20%20draft%20communique%
perma.cc/UFS4-3FND].
157. Id. at 2.

2007

1109%20%2015001.pdf [https://

158. U.K. Chair of G20, Progress Report on the Economic & Financial Actions of the London,

Washington and Pittsburgh G20 Summits, G20, 1-37, at 18 (Nov. 7, 2009), http://
www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009progressreportl107.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5KN-V83C].
159. Id. at 2.
160. The Basel Committee or BCBS is the primary global standard setter for the prudential
regulation of banks. Its forty-five members comprise central banks and bank supervisors from
twenty-eight jurisdictions. The Basel Committee- Overview, BANK FOR INT'L SErLEMENTS,
20
0n% 20Banking,bank%20
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/#:-:text=the%20Basel%20Committee%
supervisors%20from%2028%20jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/V3M7-MZYR] (last visited Oct.

17, 2020).
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The Basel

Committee stated that supervisory colleges are not a substitute for effective
national supervision of financial institutions.16 2 Furthermore, supervisory
colleges are not decision-making bodies, but rather they "provide a
framework to enhance effective supervision of international banking
groups."163 The Basel Committee noted that supervisory colleges provide a
useful forum in which to share information regarding the overall risk
assessment of a banking group and in which to discuss and plan the
supervisory assessment of a financial group. 4 Ultimately, the regular
interaction and exchange of information among supervisors within a college
should enhance the mutual trust and understanding among the supervisors.
The Principles did not prescribe a particular structure of a supervisory
college; rather, the college structure should be flexible and proportionate to
the size and complexity of the financial institution. The Principles did
recognize that the home supervisor who leads the college could designate
members of a core college and a general college.165 The home supervisor
should have regular, continuous communication with members of the core
college who represent the jurisdictions in which significant operations of the
financial institution exist. Members of the general college represent
jurisdictions where the financial institution has less significant operations.
The college should hold regular physical meetings among the supervisors
and the core college should meet at least once annually.
In June 2014, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued its
Principlesfor Effective Supervisory Colleges replacing its earlier October 2010
pronouncement.1 6 6 After several years of experience with an increased
number of supervisory colleges for global banking groups, the Basel
Committee intended to further improve the operation of supervisory
colleges and ultimately improve the stability of the global financial system.
The Basel Committee noted: "[c]olleges are now an important component
of effective supervisory oversight of an international banking group and the
G20 has reinforced the significance of colleges in the wake of the financial

crisis."167
The 2014 Principles emphasize the importance of ongoing information
sharing and not just sharing information at supervisory college meetings.168
Information sharing is only effective when there is mutual trust resulting
161. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Good Practice Principles on Supervisory Colleges,
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 1-29 (Oct. 2010), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl77.pdf

[https://perma.cc/M2BB-M7H8].
162. Id. at 1.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2.
165. See id. at 3-4.
166. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Principlesfor Effective Supervisory Colleges, BANK
FOR INT'L SErFLEMENTS, 1-30 (une 26, 2014), https://www.bis.org/pub]/bcbs287.pdf [https:/

/perma.cc/3PGQ-EQ3M].
167. Id. at 1.
168. Id. at 2.
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from confidence in the information flow between and among supervisors.
The 2014 Principles also recognized the importance of more involvement by
host supervisors but recognized that there is a balance between the number
of members of the college and the effectiveness of the college.169
Learning from its additional experience with supervisory colleges, the
Basel Committee includes more advice on the structure of colleges but does
not specify a structure for supervisory colleges. A supervisory college is

organized based on the structure and geographic scope of the global bank to
which it relates. The home supervisor is responsible for structuring the
supervisory college.170 Supervisors in countries where the global bank
operates (the host supervisors) necessarily have an interest in the overall
stability of the global bank.71
In addition to creating the structure of the supervisory college, the home
supervisor has the important role of designing and coordinating the work of
the supervisory college.172 The home supervisor sets the agenda for the
supervisory college meetings, ensures that relevant supervisory information
is shared as appropriate among the members of the college, and provides the
mechanism for such sharing and communication generally within the college

(such as a secure web platform for communication and sharing documents,
many of which are confidential).173 To assist in this information sharing, the
Basel Committee recommends entering into memoranda of understanding
that provide for the sharing of confidential information.174 Members of a
supervisory college should also collaborate in their work, such as conducting
joint on-site inspections of a global bank or reaching a joint risk assessment
of the global bank.175 Once the supervisors within a college reach a joint risk

assessment, they should coordinate on the timing and content of subsequent
communication to the global bank of the assessment. 76
The 2014 Principles extensively discuss crisis management groups and the
operation of supervisory colleges. With the issuance by the Financial
Stability Board of its 2011 Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for
Financial Institutions,77 more attention has been focused on crisis
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. See also Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Principles for Effective Supervisory
Colleges, supra note 166, at 7.

173. Id. at 8.
174. See id. at 9.
175. Id. at 12.
176. Id. at 15.
177. Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, FIN. STABILITY BD.,
(Oct. 2011), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_111104cc.pdf?pagemoved=1 [https://
perma.cc/RRQ8-JVAN] [hereinafter Effective Resolution Regimes for FinancialInstitutions (2011)].
The FSB later updated this report in October of 2014. See Key Attributes of Effective Resolution

Regimes for Financial Institutions, Fm.

STABILITY

Bo., (Oct. 2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-

content/uploads/r_141015.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR6N-GLQD] [hereinafter Effective Resolution

Regimes for FinancialInstitutions (2014)].
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preparedness and the operation of crisis management groups. Crisis
management groups address the recovery planning and resolution of global
banks and include resolution authorities and ministries of finance as well as
supervisory authorities among their membership.178 The supervisory college
focuses on information-sharing among supervisors when the global bank is a
going concern. 79 The crisis management groups come into play when the
global bank has reached "a point of non-viability."8O When this shift of

responsibility actually occurs is not clear or definite. Thus, a weakness in the
supervision of global banks is this uncertainty regarding when the resolution
authorities step in and the supervisors relinquish their supervisory role.

Thus far, this article focused on prudential supervisory standards of the
Basel Committee and the Financial Services Board. EU Member States
strongly influenced the development of these standards.181 Member States
were involved in the resolution of the Herstatt Bank, Banco Ambrosiano,
BCCI, and other banks during the Great Recession. European Union
concern with supervisory cooperation has been long-standing and its
supranational legal order has allowed for the deepened development of
supervisory cooperation and ultimately the creation of a supranational
financial supervisory agency-the Single Supervisory Mechanism of the
European Central Bank.

VII.

European Union and Supervisory Colleges

A concern among EU officials in the late 1990s and early 2000s was to
reform the EU legislative process to accelerate the passage of necessary
legislation in order to further integrate the EU financial services market.182
The Council of Ministers appointed Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy, a wellrespected central banker, former president of the European Monetary
Institute (predecessor to the European Central Bank), and past director of
the Bank for International Settlements, to chair a committee to examine and
make recommendations regarding the EU legislative process with respect to
financial services regulation.183 The Council urged the committee to focus
on the "practical arrangements for implementation of the Community rules"
of the legislative process.184
178. Effective Resolution Regimes for FinancialInstitutions (2011), supra note 177, at 16.

179. Id.
180. Id. at 7.
181. NwMAN & POSNER, supra note 3, at 77.
182. Alexandre Lamfalussy et al., Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on The Regulation of
European Securities Markets, Comm. WISE MEN, 98 (Feb.
15, 2001), https://
www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/lamfalussyreport.pdf
[https://

perma.cc/76BT-6S23].
183. European

Commission

Press

Release

Conseil/00/263,

2283rd

Council

Meeting-

ECOFIN- Brussels, Ouly 17, 2000).
184. Id. at 12. The Council specifically prohibited the Committee of Wise Men from making
recommendations on securities industry supervision. See id. at 13.
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In its Final Report, the Committee identified the legislative process as the
central impediment to integrating financial markets by 2005.185 The report

noted that the necessary EU-wide regulations of the securities markets were
not present, and that this absence has hindered the growth of the EU capital
markets.186 The legislative process in the European Union was too time-

consuming and could not keep up with changes and developments in the
fast-moving, global capital markets.187 The co-decision procedure for
enacting laws (the typical procedure used to pass EU internal market
legislation)188 generally spanned a minimum of two years, and the procedure
was even more sluggish in enacting laws pertaining to financial services.189
Within the European Union, there were over forty public bodies (in the
then fifteen Member States) that were responsible for regulating the
securities industry.190 Consequently, once the European Union enacted a
directive, the implementation of securities laws within the Member States
was frequently inconsistent.
The Committee, after considerable consultation with interested

participants, recommended a four-level approach to lawmaking related to
financial services in the European Union.191

Level 1 of the Lamfalussy

procedure refers to the adoption of directives and regulations using the codecision procedure at the EU level.192 Level 2 is the implementation of the
law by "filling in the details."193 The Report of the Wise Men recommended
the creation of a special committee of national supervisory officials to draft
these details.194 Level 3 refers to greater cooperation among national
supervisors to "ensure consistent implementation and enforcement."15
Similar to Level 2, the Lamfalussy Report recommended for Level 3 the
185. Alexandre Lamfalussy et al, supra note 182, at 5, 26.

186. Id. at 11.
187. Id. at 13 (noting that the Committee suggested that politicians set reachable short-term
goals for integration and make a concerted effort to reach those goals).

188. A detailed description of the co-decision procedure used to enact EU legislation is beyond
the scope of this article. Generally, co-decision requires agreement between the Council of the
European Union and the European Parliament before legislation becomes law. See generally

About Parliament: Legislative Powers, EuR.

PARLIAMENT,

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-

parliament/en/powers-and-procedures/legislative-powers

[https://perma.cc/7VBN-5JKC] (last

visited Oct. 15, 2020).
189. Alexandre Lamfalussy et al., supra note 182, at 14; Kees Van Dijkhuizen, A Functional

Approach to Fifty Years of Banking Supervision, in
44, 44, (Thea Kuppens et al. eds., 2003).

BANKING SUPERvISION AT THE

CROSSROADS

190. Alexandre Lamfalussy et al., supra note 182, at 15.

191. Id. at 19.
192. Id. at 22. A directive is a type of EU legislation that sets out the objectives of the law but
requires member states to enact national legislation to implement the law. See Klaus-Dieter
Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law, EUR. CMTYs., 63-71 (Dec. 2016), https://op.europa.eu/

en/publication-detail/-/publication/5d4f8cde-de25-11e7-a506-O1aa75ed71al
9TJ9-M6GM].
193. Alexandre Lamfalussy et al., supra note 182, at 28.

194. Id.
195. Id. at 37.

[https:/penna.cc/
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creation of a committee to coordinate supervisory practice among EU
member states.1 96 Level 4 refers to more effective enforcement of EU
laws.197 The European Council at its March 2001 Stockholm meeting
endorsed the Final Report of the Lamfalussy Committee.198
Resulting from the Lamfalussy Report and the EU Council Resolutions,
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) was created.
CEBS consisted of the bank supervisory authorities of the European Union
Member States and had the objective "to foster supervisory convergence
across the Community."199 In furtherance of this objective, CEBS was also
active in supporting the development of colleges of supervisors of crossborder banks within the European Union. In December 2007, CEBS issued
two documents, one entitled Range of Practices on Supervisory Colleges and
Home-Host Cooperation200and the other, Templatefor a MultilateralCooperation
Coordination Agreement on the Supervision of XY Group,201 which provided
non-binding guidelines on the operation of colleges of supervisors.
As stated earlier, the Great Recession had focused renewed attention on
colleges of supervisors as one of several tools to reduce risk within the
international financial system and the G20 had called on the Financial
Services Board and the Basel Committee to improve further supervisory
cooperation.202 CEBS updated both documents in January 2009203 and
provided more specific detail on the operation of the college of supervisors.
196. Id. at 37-39.
197. Id. at 40.
198. Presidency Conclusions, Resolution of the European Council on More Effective Securities
Market Regulation in the European Union, Stockholm European Council (Mar. 23, 2001)
(recommending that the priorities set forth by the Wise Men be implemented).
199. Commission Decision of January 23, 2009 Establishing the Committee of Eur. Bank

Supervisors, 2009 O.J. (L 25) 24, 1 13 (EC).
200. Range of Practices on Supervisory Colleges and Home-Host Cooperation, CoMm. EUR. BANKING
SUPERVISORs (Dec. 27, 2007), https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/

10180/16166/01743c25-503e-4be7-bfl3-56cabbdecb2d/
CEBS%202007%2075%20%28Range%20of%20practices%29%20final.pdf
H4GV-GK4G].

[https://perma.cc/

201. Template for a MultilateralCooperationand CoordinationAgreement on the Supervision of XY
Group, Comm. EuR. BANKiNG SUPERvISORS (an. 27, 2009), https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/

documents/files/documents/10180/16166/f4bf7b39-260c-4391-9d53 -cc27a4fd2aa9/
TemplateJan09.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7TG-26JA] (noting that the template document was a
form agreement, to be signed among supervisors, regarding the organization of the colleges and
setting forth how the supervisors will interact with one another in supervising a particular
bank). The agreement goes into detail about the exchange of information and communication
within the group and sets forth responsibilities of each of the regulators who are a party to the
agreement. Id.

202. G20 Leaders, supra note 139.
203. Press Release, Franca Rosa Congiu, Eur. Banking Authority, CEBS Has Published a
Revised Template for Written Agreements Between Supervisors for the Functioning of
Colleges, Gan. 27, 2009), https://eba.europa.eu/cebs-has-published-a-revised-template-for[https://perma.cc/
written-agreements-between-supervisors-for-the-functioning-of-colleges-

4X2P-G29H] (CEIOPS and the Interim Working Group on Financial Conglomerates joined in
issuing these documents).
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In its Colleges of Supervisors - 10 Common Principles,-4 CEBS provides that a
college of supervisors shall supervise any cross-border insurance group,
banking group or financial conglomerate.205 The colleges "flexible,

permanent

fora for cooperation

and

coordination

among financial

supervisory authorities"206 "shall have agreements in place describing the

cooperation between the supervisors and the practical organization of the
supervisory activities" of the financial institution.207 For banking groups, the
consolidating supervisor as defined in the Capital Requirements Directive
"shall initiate the cooperation process."208 The colleges shall also promote
harmonization of supervisory approaches and coordinate all major

supervisory decisions.209 In addition, the colleges shall plan and coordinate
supervisory on-site inspections and share the findings from such visits with
other members of the college.210
While not significantly different from the 2007 version, the 2009 Template
for a MultilateralCooperation CoordinationAgreement removes some discretion
given to the supervisor under the earlier agreement and requires supervisors

to cooperate more fully with their peers in the supervision of cross-border
banks.211 For instance, the new agreement adds a provision stating, "[s]hould
the authorities in a College not reach an agreement, as foreseen by the CRD

[Capital Requirements Directive] the matter may be referred for mediation
to the Committee of European Banking Supervisors."212
In January 2009, the European Commission in a decision further
strengthened CEBS's supervisory cooperation role2m3 by providing that the

committee shall "mediate or facilitate mediation between supervisory
authorities in cases specified in the relevant legislation or at the request of
the supervisory authority."214 Under this provision, CEBS is authorized to

mediate between supervisors-authority it did not have under the 2004
decision originally creating CEBS.215
204. Comm. Eur. Banking Supervisors

Previously, colleges of supervisors

[CEBS], Comm. Eur. Insurance & Occupational

Pensions Supervisors [CEIOPS], Colleges of Supervisors-10 Common Principles, at 1-5,
CEIOPS-SEC-54/08, CEBS 2008 124 (lan. 27, 2009), https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/publications/stand-guide-recom/cebs-ceiops-iwcfc-10-principles-colleges-ofsupervisors.pdf~source=search [https://perma.cc/VH9N-NBTJ].

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1-2.
at 2.
at 3.
at 3-4.
at 4.
at 4-5.

211. See Template for a Multilateral Cooperation and CoordinationAgreement on the Supervision of
XY Group, supra note 201.

212. Id. at § 6.1(26).
213. Commission Decision of Jan. 23, 2009 Establishing the Committee of European Bank
Supervisors, supra note 169, art. 16, at 27 (repealing the 2004 decision initially establishing the
Committee of European Banks Supervisors).

214. Id. at art. 4(1)(a), 25.
215. See Commission Decision of November 5, 2003, Establishing the Committee of Eur. Bank
Supervisors, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 28 (EC).
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made all decisions by consensus and had no mechanism to resolve conflicts
other than by negotiation and mutual cooperation.216 At least for
supervisory authorities within the European Union, this 2009 decision
allows the CEBS to mediate these disputes.217 This decision also specifically
requires CEBS to "contribute to insuring the efficient and consistent
functioning of colleges of supervisors in particular through setting guidelines
for the operational functioning of colleges, monitoring the coherence of the
practices of different colleges and sharing those practices."218 CEBS is
authorized to ensure that colleges of supervisors apply EU law and
implementing measures consistently across financial institutions and that
cross-border banks are supervised consistently by colleges of supervisors
with varying membership.219
The EU took additional steps to buttress colleges as a supervisory tool.220
In several EU directives, the European Union institutionalized greater
cooperation among supervisors supervising cross-border banks.221 In the
adoption of the Basel H directive dealing with capital requirements of credit
institutions,222 the European Union specifically created rules dealing with

cooperation among supervisors of cross-border banks operating in the
European Union. In its proposal for the Basel II Directive,223 the European
Commission noted that the establishment of colleges of supervisors would
"facilitate the tasks of the consolidating supervisor and the host
supervisors."224 Chapter 4 (Articles 124 through 144) of this directive lays
216. Id.
217. Commission Decision of January 23, 2009 Establishing the Committee of Eur. Bank

Supervisors, 2009 O.J. (L 25) 25, art. 4(1)(a), (EC).
218. Id.
219. On December 17, 2009, CEBS issued a consultation paper on guidelines for the
operational functioning of colleges of supervisors. See Consultation Paper on CEBS's Guidelines
for the OperationalFunctioning of Colleges, Comm. EuR. BANKJNG SUPERVISORs, 19 (Dec. 17,
2009), https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/37070/1a3c55a1-

74c0-40de-bl7f-993aa3d39b86/CP34.pdfretry=1 [https://perma.cc/6KQA-2VMB].
220. See, e.g., Council Directive 2006/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
June 2006 Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions (Recast),

2006 O.J. (L 177) 1 (EC).
221. See id.; Council Directive 2006/49 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
June 2006 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions (Recast), 2006

O.J. (L 177) 201 (EC).
222. Council Directive 2006/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June
2006 Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions (Recast), 2006

O.J.

(L 177) 1 (EC); Council Directive 2006/49 of the European Parliament and of the Council

of 14 June 2006 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions (Recast),

2006 O.J. (L 177) 201 (EC).
223. Proposal for a Directive of the Eur. Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as Regards Banks Affiliated to Central Institutions, Certain Own
Funds Items, Large Exposures, Supervisory Arrangements, and Crisis Management, at 2, COM

(2008) 602 fnal (Jan. 10, 2008).
224. Id. at 9.

108

[VOL. 54, NO. 1

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

out rules determining which supervisor, also known as the lead supervisor,
exercises consolidated supervision over the cross-border bank.225

One weakness of the college of supervisors under these previous directives
was the lack of a mandatory mediation process if the supervisors cannot
agree on an action with respect to the supervision of the financial
institution.226 As seen during the Great Recession, this lack of mediation

allowed supervisors to act on their own and not in coordination with their
peers. For example, in the fall 2008 rescue of Fortis, the financial group
with operations in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the national
supervisors struggled to coordinate their actions.227 At first, the Benelux

governments bought 49 percent of the equity of Fortis.22

Then a few days

later, the Dutch government seized the Dutch operations of Fortis and the
Belgian and Luxembourgian operations were sold to BNP Paribas.229 These
events illustrate reveal a lack of effective supervisory cooperation,

particularly during times of crisis. Recognizing the weaknesses in the
supervisory system highlighted by the financial crises, the European Union
responded with legislative proposals to reform the system within the
European Union.230

VIII.

European Union's Reform of Financial Supervision

As a response to the Great Recession and multiple bank failures, EU
leaders revisited the supervisory structure of the EU banking system. On
February 25, 2009, a high level group of advisors, chaired by Jacques de
Larosiere, former Governor of the Banque de France, issued its report on
the reform of the European Union system of financial supervision, also
known as the Larosiere Report.231 Appointed by Jose Barroso, the President
of the European Commission, in the fall of 2008, the High-Level Group was
charged with a broad mandate "to make proposals to strengthen European
supervisory arrangements covering all financial sectors, with the objective to
225. Council Directive 2006/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June

2006 Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions (Recast), 2006
O.J. (L 177) art. 124-44, 1 (EC).
226. See id.; Council Directive 2006/49 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
June 2006 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions (Recast), 2006

O.J. (L 177) 201 (EC).
227. Nikki Tait & Jennifer Hughes, Trichet Says Regulation Must Be Extended, FmN. TTMES, (Feb.
[https://
23, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/3eb481eO-01a6-1lde-8199-000077b07658
perma.cc/M8YZ-PCMM].
228. Ulrich Volz, Europe Needs a United Approach to the Credit Crunch, WALL ST.

2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122333891159809861
B7YL-5E7M].
229. Id.

J.,

(Oct. 7,

[https://perma.cc/

230. See Jacques de Larosiere et al., The High-Level Group en Financial Supervision in the EU
Report of Brussels, (Feb. 25, 2009), https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/

pdfs/publicationl4527_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5K2-3PQL].
231. Id. (holding eleven public meetings and consulting widely to develop its thirty-one

recommendations to improve financial services regulation within the EU).
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establish a more efficient, integrated and sustainable European system of
supervision."232 While a complete analysis of this report is beyond the scope
of this article, this article will focus on the report's recommendations related
to supervisory cooperation within the European Union. The Larosiere
Report recommended that, for cross-border institutions, the colleges of

supervisors introduced by the revised Capital Requirements Directive and
the then proposed Solvency II Directive should take the lead in
supervision.233 The colleges of supervisors should be strengthened by
"participation of representatives of the secretariat of the Level 3 committees
as well as of the European Central Bank and European System of Central
Bank Supervisors."234 The Larosiere Report in Recommendation 18 advised

that "colleges of supervisors would be set up for all major cross-border
institutions."35
The report also states that the "relatively restricted use of supervisory
colleges should be expanded immediately."236 By the end of 2009,
supervisory colleges should be established for all major cross-border firms
within the European Union,237 estimated to be at least fifty financial
institutions.238 The Level 3 committees239 would participate in this process
by defining the final supervisory practices and arrangements for the
functioning of the colleges of supervisors.2- "The clear intent is to expand
the mandate of CEBS-to be more inclusive of the supervisory players and
to broaden the tasks of colleges beyond those stated in the CRD."241 This
232. European Commission Press Release IP/08/1679, High Level Expert Group on EU

Financial Supervision to Hold First Meeting of 12 November (Nov. 11, 2008).
233. Larosiere et al., supra note 230, at 47 (enacting the Solvency Directive later); See also

Directive 2009/138, 2006 O.J. (L 335) 1 (EC).
234. Id. The Level 3 committees refer to the Committee of European Banking Supervisors
(CEBS), the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), and the Committee of
European Insurance and Occupational Pension Supervisors (CEIOPS). These committees
were set up under the Lamfalussy process to advise the Commission and its committees on
implementing measures need to effectuate financial regulation. See generally Duncan Alford,
The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another Step on The Road to Pan-European
Regulation, 25 ANN. REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 389, 397-406 (2006).
235. Larosiere et al., supra note 230, at 48.

236. Id. at 51.
237. Id.
238. Id. Larosiere et al., supra note 230, at 51, n.13; see infra Annex lI (listing systemically
important financial institutions that the Financial Stability Board purportedly compiled in

November 2009).
239. See generally Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation, supra note 234.
240. The Larosiere Report envisioned that the Level 3 committees under the Lamfalussy
process would eventually become European authorities or regulatory agencies-the European
Banking Authority, the European Insurance Authority, and the European Securities Authority.
Larosiere et al., supra note 230, at 52-53. See also Duncan E. Alford, The Operation of Supervisory
Colleges after the Single Supervisory Mechanism of the European Banking Union, BANKING L.J.
§ 2019-2.02, at 2-5 (discussing the best practice documents issued by CEBS on the operation of
colleges of supervisors).

241. Duncan Alford, Supervisory Colleges: The Global FinancialCrisis and Improving International
Supervisory Coordination, 24 EMoRY INT'L L. REv. 57, 67 (2010).
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recommendation is a logical precursor to the report's medium-term goal of
creating a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS).242 The ESFS

would transform the Level 3 committees into three supervisory authorities,
one for each financial sector: banking, securities, and insurance.243 The
authorities are tasked to ensure "consistency of prudential supervision"244
and to define "common supervisory practices and arrangements for the
functioning of the colleges of supervisors."245
The European Council of the European Union took up the Larosiere
Report at its March 2009 meeting.246 The Council "agreed on the need to
improve the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in the
[European Union] and that the report from the High Level Group on

financial supervision chaired by Jacques de Larosiere is the basis for
action."247
In May 2009,

the European

Commission issued a communication

describing its planned actions based on the Larosiere report, 248 calling for
comments from interested parties during a consultation period, and setting
forth a revision of the European supervisory structure based on two pillars:
(1) the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) to deal with

macroprudential supervision and (2) the creation of the European System of
Financial Supervisors (ESFS) to deal with micro-prudential supervision, that
is, supervision of individual financial institutions.249 The ESFS is charged

with developing a "harmonized core set of standards"250 and a "common
supervisory culture."251 The Commission's legislative proposals go beyond

the framework developed at the G20 summits and create an integrated
financial supervisory structure within the European Union.252
The Commission stated that the current Level 3 Committees must move

beyond being advisory bodies and should become European supervisory
authorities with legal personalities and additional powers and
responsibilities.253 As part of the ESFS, the Commission proposed creating
242. Larosiere et al., supra note 230, at 52-55.

243. Id. at 52.
244. Id. at 53.
245. Id.
246. The European Council, consisting of the Heads of State of the Member States of the
European Union, meets quarterly. See European Council Overview, EUROPA, https://europa.eu/
[https://perma.cc/245Peuropean-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-council-en

YRDC] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020).
247. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 78780/90, at 3 (Mar. 20, 2009),
http://data.consilimn.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7880-2009-INIT/en/pdf

[https://perma.cc/

V6ND-6SHG].
248. Communication from the Commission: European Financial Supervision, at 2, COM

(2009) 252
249. Id. at
250. Id. at
251. Id.
252. Id. at
253. Id. at

final (May 27, 2009).
3.
4.
8.
8-9.
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three new supervisory authorities-the European Banking Authority (the
EBA), the European Securities Markets Authority (the ESMA), and the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (the EIOPA).254
The May communication relies heavily on colleges of supervisors as "the

lynchpin of the supervisory system"255 as they will ensure "a balanced flow of
information between home and host authorities."256 The EBA will
participate in the colleges as an observer, will ensure that colleges use
consistent practices in supervising financial instructions,257 and will facilitate
the distribution of micro-prudential information to all national supervisors
in a particular college.258 The expectation is that the college will take an
institution-wide view regarding prudential supervision, rather than just a
national view. 259
After negotiations within the Council of Ministers and between the
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, the final EBA regulation
was enacted and did strengthen the financial supervisory system in the
European Union. The EBA can issue binding technical standards, subject to
review by the European Commission.260 But according to the regulation,
the standards shall not include public "policy choices,"261 an ambiguous
phrase that limits EBA discretion. The EBA Board of Supervisors must
approve any standards by qualified majority voting.262 The regulation
continues the EBA's role in a college of supervisors23 and encourages the
development of a common reporting format of prudential information.264
The EBA is an observer in all colleges of supervisors and is obligated to
create a central system for the collection of prudential information on
financial institutions.265 The EBA can settle disputes among supervisors.266
To ensure its independence, the EBA has a separate budget, financed by the
EU General Budget and Member States.267

257. European

Commission MEMO/09/251,

The Commission, Financial Supervision

-

254. Id.
255. Id. at 9.
256. Id.
Frequently Asked Questions (May 27, 2009).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 3.
260. Commission Regulation 1093/10 of Dec. 15, 2010, Establishing a European Supervisory

Authority (European Banking Authority), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12, 23.
261. Id. at art. 10(1).
262. Id. at art. 44(1). Qualified majority voting is the method of voting used for approval of
most EU legislation by the Council of Ministers. See generally Qualified Majority, CoUNCIL
EuR. UNION, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-major

ity/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2020), [https://perma.cc/74QK-JDHP].
263. Commission Regulation 1093/10, art. 8(1)(b), at 21 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12, 23.
264. Id. at art. 29.
265. Id. at art. 12.
266. Id. at art. 19(1).
267. Id. at art. 62(1)(a-c).
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Single Supervisory Mechanism of the European Union

The sovereign debt crisis in certain EU Member States beginning in 2010
highlighted the continuing weaknesses in the supervisory regime under the

EBA. National supervisors continued to play a significant role in the
supervision of cross-border banking groups. 268 The connection between
sovereign bonds and banks severely weakened confidence in the banking
system in some EU Member

States.269

As a result,

the European

Commission proposed the Banking Union in order to sever the link between
sovereign debt and the banking system and to improve the supervision of
cross-border banks.270 The Banking Union proposal consisted of three
pillars: the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution

Mechanism, and a common deposit insurance scheme.271
The European Union brought into effect the first pillar of the Banking
Union-the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)-on November 4,
2014.272 At that time, the European Central Bank (ECB) became the
prudential supervisor of the 120 largest banking groups (or significant
financial institutions) in the Eurozone.273 These 120 banking groups
represented approximately 85 percent of the banking assets within the

Eurozone.274
The legal basis for the ECB's role as the single European prudential
supervisor is Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.275 The appointment of another EU institution or agency

would have required a treaty amendment which was not politically feasible at
the time.276 Nineteen Member States of the European Union are currently

members of the Eurozone and thus also the SSM.277 Bulgaria, Croatia, the
268. Special Report - European Banking Supervision Taking Shape - EBA and its Changing Context,
EUR. CT. AUDITORS, 1, 8 (2014), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/

?uriceLEX:52014SA0005&rid=3 [https://perma.cc/5ADC-TLLX].
269. See Jos6 Manuel Gonzalez-Piramo, Member Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech at
the XXIV Mondea y Credito Symposium Madrid (Nov. 4, 2011) in Jose Manuel GonzdlezPdramo: The ECB and the Sovereign Debt Crisis, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTs (Nov. 7, 2011),
https://www.bis.org/review/r11I107c.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PWU-WJJG].
270. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council A

Roadmap Towards a Banking Union, at 3, COM (2012) 510 final (Dec. 12, 2012).
271. Id. at 4, 6.
272. Guide to Banking Supervision, EUR. CENTRAL BANK 1-2 (Sept. 2014), https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ssmguidebankingsupervision

2

01409en.pdf

[https://

perma.cc/YA7G-ZDD6].
273. Id. at 9, 12.
274. Id. at 12 (The Eurozone refers to the Member States who have adopted the euro as their
currency).
275. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art.

127(6), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 103.
276. Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, How Europe Can Muddle Through its

Crisis, at 1, No. PB10-27 (Dec. 2010).
277. See Which Countries Use the Euro, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/euro/which-countries-use-euro-en

2020).

[https://perma.cc/V8ZE-AZAY]
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Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania are not members of the
Eurozone but, by the terms of their accession treaties with the European
Union, they are required to join the Eurozone once they have met certain
economic criteria.278 Denmark and the United Kingdom are not obligated
to join the Eurozone under the EU treaties.279 Sweden is not a member of
the Eurozone and in the past has resisted joining the Banking Union because
of the necessary loss of authority over its largest banks.280
The second pillar of the EU Banking Union-the Single Resolution
Mechanism-began operation in 2016.28, But the SRM will not be fully
operational and funded until 2022.282 The third pillar-a common deposit
insurance scheme for the Eurozone-is currently being debated within the
European Union institutions and it is still a long way from
implementation.283
Prior to the creation of the SSM, banks throughout the European Union
were supervised by national competent authorities (NCAs) or national bank
supervisors with some coordination by supervisory colleges and the EBA as
described above.284 As a result, national supervisors took different
supervisory approaches and took advantage of national discretions available
in EU banking laws.285 Banking groups recognized this regulatory arbitrage
and structured their banking operations accordingly.286
Under the SSM, the ability to take advantage of this regulatory arbitrage
is reduced.287 The ECB supervises the largest banks in the Eurozone; the
278. Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of
Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia,
and the Slovak Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties on Which the European Union is

Founded, 2003 O.J. (L 236) 33.
279. Glossary of Summaries: Opting Out, EuR-LEx, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/
opting.out.html [https://perma.cc/D8VV-P3A3] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020).
280. Helene Duaschy, Sweden Mulls Membership in European Banking Union, AGENCE FR.
PRESSE (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.yahoo.com/news/sweden-mulls-membership-european-

banking-union-031351638.html [https://perma.cc/XRH4-K2UY].
281. Fact Sheets on the European Union: Banking Union, EuR. PARLIAMENT,
www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/88/banking-union
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UKQB] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020).
282. See Single Resolution Fund, SINGLE RESOLUTION BOARD, at 4, 11 (May 2016), https://
srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/single-resolution-fund_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JRW-LJQY].
283. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in Order to Establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, at 2,

COM (2015) 586 final (Nov. 24, 2015); Fact Sheets on the European Union: Banking Union, supra
note 281.
284. See Special Report - European Banking Supervision Taking Shape - EBA and its Changing
Context, supra note 268, at 8.

285. Eddy Wymeersch, The Single Supervisory Mechanism or "SSM," Part One of the Banking
Union 8 (Nat'l Bank of Belg., Working Paper No. 240/2014, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2397800 [https://perma.cc/4TX3-TWS6].
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smaller banks, or more specifically the less significant banking groups, will
continue to be supervised by national supervisors under the general
oversight of the ECB.288 These smaller banks numbering several thousand
represent approximately eighteen percent of Eurozone banking assets and
the vast majority are located in Austria, Germany, and Italy.289 The result is

a two-tiered system of bank supervision,290 in some ways, similar to the dual
banking system in the United States.291

Banking groups with their home

office outside the Eurozone will continue to be supervised by the national
bank supervisor of their home jurisdiction.292 The SSM does allow EU
Member States outside of the Eurozone to opt into the ECB's supervisory
regime but, thus far, no EU Member State has done so. 293
Inevitably after November 2014, the SSM caused the reorganization of
supervisory colleges both within and without the Eurozone.294 The ECB
took over the role of national bank supervisors of the nineteen Eurozone
nations in the supervisory colleges that previously existed.295 If a banking
group operates only in the Eurozone, no supervisory college exists because
the ECB assumes the role of all the national bank supervisors.296 If the head
288. Id. at 13.
289. Sabine Lautenschlager, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the
ECB's Supervisory Board, Speech at the Banking Evening of the Deutsche Bundesbank

Regional Office in Baden-Wnrttemberg (Feb. 22, 2016) in Caught in the Middle? Small and
Medium Sized Banks and European Banking Supervision, EuR. CENTRAL BANK (Feb. 22, 2016),
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2020).
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April

2019),
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office of a banking group is located within the Eurozone, the ECB serves as
the home supervisor.297
National supervisors from non-Eurozone
jurisdictions continue to serve in that college.298 If the head office of the
banking group is outside of the Eurozone, the national supervisor in the

jurisdiction where the head office is located is the home supervisor of the
supervisory college and the ECB represents the Eurozone national
supervisors as a host supervisor in such supervisory college.299 The national
supervisors from the Eurozone may continue to participate as observers, but
they defer any decision-making to the ECB.300 As a result of the SSM, the
ECB takes on a more influential role in supervisory colleges as it substitutes
for any of the nineteen Eurozone supervisors that previously served in such
college.
Under the SSM, the ECB exercises its supervisory authority over the
largest banks operating in the Eurozone through Joint Supervisory Teams
JSTs), which substitute for the supervisory college of a Eurozone banking
group. 30' The JST is the principal form of cooperation between the ECB
and national supervisors of Eurozone members.302 Created for each of the
cross-border banking groups supervised by the ECB, a JST consists of ECB
supervisory officials and officials from the national supervisors in the
jurisdictions where the cross-border banking group operates. 303 The SSM
Regulation states that National Competent Authority (NCA) staff will assist
the ECB with "the ongoing day-to-day assessment of a credit institution's
situation and related on-site verifications."304 The JSTs are multinational
teams of supervisors from all Eurozone countries.305 They communicate in
multiple languages and come from different supervisory cultures.306 JSTs
vary in size depending on the size and importance of the supervised bank.307
An ECB official-the JST coordinator-heads the JST and officials from
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at art. 4(1)(b).
Id. at 67.
Id. at art. 17(1).
Council Regulation 1024/2013, art. 4(1)(g), 2013 O.J. (L 287) 77 (EU).
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(last visited Oct. 15,

2020).
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(2014). National Competent Authorities are the national bank supervisory authorities of an EU
Member State, for example, Bafin (Federal Financial Supervisory Authority) in Germany. Id.
305. Single Supervisory Mechanism-Good Start but FurtherImprovements Needed, EuR. COURT
AUDITORs, at 53 (2016), https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/News/NEWS1611_18/SR_SSM
_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMQ3-GJAU).
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the national supervisors also serve on the JST.308 The nationality of the JST

coordinator may not be the same as the country where the home office of
the banking group supervised is located.309 To further ensure independence,
the JST coordinator for a particular bank is generally appointed to a three to
five year term. 31 0
Banks with cross-border operations in the European Union are supervised

by a supervisory college or a JST, except for less significant banks where the
National Competent Authority supervises the bank.311 EU law requires
supervisory colleges governing bank operations within the European Union
312
The tasks of a
to make specific supervisory decisions and assessments.
supervisory college within the EU are specified by EU banking law,
particularly the Capital Requirements Directive313 and the Bank Resolution

and Recovery Directive.314 These tasks include: the adoption of a written
cooperation and coordination agreement (WCCA), group risk assessment,
group liquidity assessment, joint decision on capital and liquidity,3'5 and
joint decision on the assessment of group recovery plans.316
EU law, primarily the Capital Requirements Directive, also specifies
which NCAs serve on supervisory colleges of cross-border banks operating
in the European Union.317 NCAs where subsidiaries and significant

branches, as defined in EU law, are located generally serve on supervisory
colleges in the European Union.318 While the Basel Committee standards-

the Minimum Standards and Core Principles-recommended

sharing

information and risk assessments of international banks,319 EU law has gone
308. See Single Supervisory Mechanism-Good Start but FurtherImprovements Needed, supra note

305, at 18.
309. Guide to Banking Supervision, supra note 272, at 15. However, in the startup of the SSM,

this policy has not always been followed. See Special Report - European Banking Supervision
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Institutions and Investment Firms, Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and Repealing Directives

2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, art. 116, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 398.
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2014 Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and
Investment Firms and Amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC,

2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/
EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament
and of the Council, art. 18, 25, 30, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 237, 243, 246-47.
315. Council Directive 2013/36/EU, art. 116(1), 2013 O.J. (L 176) 398.
316. Council Directive 2014/59/EU, art. 6(2), 8(2), 2014 O.J. (L 173).
317. Council Directive 2013/36/EU, art. 131, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 398.
318. Council Directive 2013/36/EU, art. 116(6), 2013 O.J. (L 176) 398.
319. See Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, supra note 110, at 405; Minimum
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further and required supervisory colleges to make these decisions and
assessments jointly.320 Within the Eurozone, supervisory colleges are
decision-making bodies and issue binding decisions on cross-border banks.

X.

Conclusion

The development of international financial markets and the resulting
increase in international bank failures provided the impetus for supervisory
cooperation among bank regulators beginning in the 1970s. Early common

supervisory standards were general, non-binding statements of best practice.
The Concordat was a general statement regarding supervisory cooperation
that did not make clear who was the primary supervisor of an international
bank. Does the home supervisor or the host supervisor act in the event of a
bank failure? There was no clear statement regarding lender of last resort
responsibilities.
The Revised Concordat was a more specific, but nevertheless still general,
statement of supervisory cooperation. This statement did establish dual key
supervision where both the home supervisor and host supervisor must be
satisfied with the other's supervisory capacity and practice or they could
restrict the operation of the international bank within their jurisdiction.321
The Revised Concordat clearly adopted the principle of consolidated
supervision. But it made no statement regarding lender of last resort
responsibility.
The Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking
Groups was an even more specific statement regarding supervisory
cooperation. The standards clearly stated the home supervisor must conduct
consolidated supervision of the international bank.322 The home supervisor
is the primary regulator.323 Both home and host supervisor approval are
required to open a foreign banking establishment.324
The Great Recession of 2007-2008 caused multiple reform efforts in
international financial regulation. This article has focused on the increased
use of supervisory colleges in regulating international banks. Previously,
supervisory colleges existed for international banks, but the reform efforts
placed a new emphasis on supervisory colleges as tools for supervisory
cooperation. The Basel Committee issued general, non-binding statements
regarding the operation of supervisory colleges-the 2010 Good Practice
Principles and subsequently the 2014 Principles for Effective Supervisory
Colleges which provided further detail on the best use of supervisory

colleges.325
320. Council Directive 2013/36/EU, art. 113, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 398.
321. Revised Concordat, supra note 43, at 903-04.
322. Minimum Standards, supra note 84, at 3.
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Colleges, supra note 161, at 7.
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EU Member States as members of the Basel Committee influenced these
standards. The European Union went beyond the mere typical information-

sharing of supervisory colleges and created a bank supervisory legal
structure. Based on recommendations in the Lamfalussy Report, the
European Union created the Committee of European Bank Supervisors, an

advisory body.326

After the Great Recession, the Larosiere

Report

recommended the creation of European supervisory authorities, including
the European Banking Authority.327 The EBA had legal powers and the
power to mediate disputes between national competent authorities.328 This
mediation power or any type of dispute resolution mechanism was not

present in any of the earlier Basel Committee standards.
After the Eurozone crisis, the European Union created a supranational
bank regulator-the Single Supervisory Mechanism within the European

Central Bank.329

The SSM supervises the largest banks within the

Eurozone, created a more uniform supervisory culture for banks operating

within the Eurozone and reduced, to a certain degree, national discretion by
Member States' national supervisory authorities.330 Through joint
supervisory teams, the SSM coordinates with national supervisors in the

supervision and regulation of these banks.331 Because the SSM substitutes
for the national

supervisors of the nineteen Eurozone members,

the

membership of supervisory colleges was streamlined and simplified. In
addition to the creation of this supranational prudential supervisor, EU law
required supervisory colleges to make certain substantive decisions and risk
assessments regarding banks operating within the European Union.332 The
European Union thus created both legal requirements for supervisory
cooperation and a supervisory structure to ensure those requirements are

fulfilled.
This article illustrates a case study of how soft law on supervisory
cooperation over a fifty-year period became binding, hard law in stages
within the European Union. General, non-binding statements of an

international standard-setting body-the Basel Committee-were the
beginning of this process. Bank failures beginning in the 1970s and
continuing into the 1980s and 1990s led to the creation of the Basel
Committee and its pronouncements on international standards of
supervisory cooperation.m33

As the international banking system became

more global and interconnected, particularly in the European Union,
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structural changes were made to the supervisory system in the European
Union and even more so in the Eurozone.334 Events over this period,
including EU efforts to integrate the financial services market, the Great
Recession, and the Eurozone crisis, caused these general statements to
become more specific and detailed.335 Eventually, the European Union took
the further step of incorporating these standards into enforceable EU law
(banking directives and regulations) and creating a supranational supervisory
authority for banks operating in the Eurozone-the Single Supervisory
Mechanism of the European Central Bank-to enforce these regulations and

directives and to develop a common supervisory culture. Therefore, spurred
by external events over decades, soft law on supervisory cooperation has
become enforceable hard law within the European Union.
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